Enhancing DHS Information Support to State and Local Fusion Centers:

Results of the Chief Intelligence Officer's

Pilot Project and Next Steps

Submitted to:
Chief Intelligence Officer
Department of Homeland Security

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I. Key Findings and Recommendations

Under the direction of the Chief Intelligence Officer (CINT), the DHS SLFC Pilot Project Team developed and put in place new procedures designed to upgrade the quality of DHS information support to SLFCs at six pilot sites:

- To improve the quality of DHS RFI responses, the Team worked with DHS officers to establish a single point of service for all RFIs -- with responsibility for making sure that any RFI submitted from a pilot site receives a timely and appropriate response.

- To create a more SLFC-focused finished intelligence production planning process, the Team worked with each Pilot site to develop and provide to I&A's production divisions a limited set of top priority issues – "SLFC Priority Information Needs" -- that reflects each site's substantive focus for the coming year.

- To accelerate efforts to upgrade SLFC Open Source capabilities, the Team worked with experts in I&A, with the ADDNI for Open Source, and with the Open Source Center to launch a training program to improve SLFC analysts' ability to use state-of-the-art exploitation techniques and to expand their access to relevant federal databases.

Feedback from senior officials at the Pilot site SLFCs indicates that these pilot programs have markedly improved DHS SLFC support efforts and resulted in a new appreciation among SLFC leaders for the role that DHS and federal government intelligence support can play in assisting them to carry out their homeland security mission.

The Project Team believes these Pilot Program successes create the foundation for a robust nationwide SLFC support program in the months ahead. Drawing on the results of the Pilot, the Team worked with I&A officers to develop a proposed Action Plan for CINT and the Deputy Under Secretary for Intelligence (DUS-I) to consider, which we believe will assist them implement this nationwide program. Our suggestions involve six core initiatives:

1. Establish a staff element that will serve as focal point for all SLFC RFIs, expanding on the RFI process established for the six pilot sites.

- DUS-I has mandated that I&A/PM be given authority for tracking, assigning responsibility, and keeping senior I&A leadership informed. The Project Team will work with PM leaders to develop procedures to support a nationwide SLFC RFI activity.

2. Establish a DHS production planning process that is focused on identified SLFC needs.

- DUS-I has tasked the Project Team to create a nationwide SLFC Priority Information Needs program in the months ahead building on the set of PINs that were developed for the six pilot sites

- DUS-I has instructed each analytic division in I&A develop procedures that ensure that its finished intelligence production responds to expressed SLFC analytical needs. I&A analytic divisions are currently responding to this mandate.

- To oversee and assist DHS efforts to align reporting and analysis more effectively with SLFC needs, and to advise DHS leadership on this issue, the Team proposes that the CINT establish a working group composed of senior analysts from I&A's analytic divisions and other DHS components such as ICE and CBP. This group would reside in PM division.

3. Establish I&A/CR/OS as the focal point for an integrated DHS program to assist the SLFCs to develop their Open Source exploitation capabilities.

- We strongly endorse I&A's plan to establish Mobile Training Teams charged with providing onsite support to SLFCs nationwide, including providing training and consultation upon request – following up the initial open source training now being conducted at part of the pilot project.

- We recommend that I&A/OS create an online open source training regime that will be accessible to SLFCs nationwide.

4. Strengthen DHS leadership direction of the SLFC support effort and integrate administrative and logistical support with the substantive support provided by the analytical divisions in I&A.

- The Team suggests that the CINT make permanent the SLFC Support Leadership Council that operated informally during the pilot project. The Leadership Council could be chaired by the CINT or a senior deputy and might include the Deputy Under Secretary for Operations, DUS-I, and the Assistant Deputy Under Secretary for External Communications, as well as senior leaders from all DHS components that play a critical role in SLFC support.

- The Team recommends that the CINT consider setting forth his vision for taking SLFC support to the next level in a visible, public fashion to ensure that DHS officers across the enterprise understand the priority of the SLFC mission.

5. Develop performance metrics and collect customer feedback in order to assist the Leadership Council and I&A Analytic Divisions to evaluate the quality of SLFC support.

6. *Develop a long-term strategic plan for integrating all DHS components as well as key Intelligence Community agencies into an I&A-led SLFC intelligence support activity.*

- Effectively integrating DHS components and IC agencies is a long-term challenge but one that is critical to the SLFC support effort.

- The Project Team recommends that the CINT consider establishing a task force of senior officers from I&A and other DHS components to develop this strategic plan.

The Project Team understands that our proposed Action Plan is am ambitious undertaking, and that several of the recommendations only can be carried out over the longer term. But we are convinced that its core elements are based on solid results from the Pilot Program and that it offers the opportunity to take DHS support to the SLFCs to a new level, as the CINT has mandated.   The Team is prepared to offer all necessary support to implement the Plan.

II. Executive Summary

DHS' Chief Intelligence Officer (CINT) tasked the State and Local Fusion Center (SLFC) Pilot Project Team to work with fusion centers in five states (California, Florida, Illinois, Massachusetts, and New York) to enhance DHS support in three critical areas--responding to SLFC requests for information (RFIs), providing SLFCs with reporting and analysis that responds to their mission-critical information needs, and assisting SLFCs with their open source exploitation capabilities.

The Team worked with DHS officers and SLFC leaders in these states to develop an effective response to the CINT's charge. Based on our discussions, we:

- Put in place new procedures to immediately enhance the quality of DHS support to the pilot sites

- Developed an Action Plan for CINT and the Deputy Under Secretary for Intelligence (DUS-I) to consider for upgrading DHS support to SLFCs nationwide.

The pilot program initiatives have already created new momentum in the DHS SLFC partnership, met a positive response from the pilot sites, and established the basis for a robust nationwide SLFC support program.

- To maintain the momentum and ensure a smooth transition, DUS-I has asked the Project Team to make sure that pilot program structures remain in place and operational until the follow-on actions proposed in the Action Plan are implemented.

Taking DHS Support to SLFCs to the Next Level

Given the growing diversity and complexity of the SLFC network, DHS has made significant strides in expanding its support over the last two years. The deployment of I&A representatives, the establishment of a Community of Interest on HSIN-SLIC to link SLFC partners, and the dissemination of an expanding number of intelligence products create a solid foundation for actions to increase the quality of DHS intelligence support in the months ahead.

While establishing a solid foundation for the future, our work at the pilot sites led the Team to conclude that the CINT should consider taking a number of additional steps in order to create an SLFC-centered intelligence process that provides the SLFCs the intelligence support they need to carry out their mission. ***Despite recent improvements in DHS support, we found a substantial gap still exists between the kind of support the pilot sites said they need and the kind of support they have been receiving from DHS across a range of issues, including the three focus areas of the pilot project.*** SLFC leaders remain optimistic, however, that targeted programs such as this pilot project can create a more productive relationship in the months ahead.

In the Team's view, further improvements in SLFC support will depend primarily on steps by I&A to:

- ***Take a more cohesive approach to identifying SLFC needs that brings together and integrates the State and Local Program Office's (SLPO's) administrative and logistical support with the substantive support provided by the analytical divisions in I&A. Decisions about how to provide SLFCs the support that they need on mission-critical substantive issues should drive decision-making about the deployment and training of I&A representatives to the SLFCs and other administrative and logistical issues.***

- ***Strengthen the existing organizational framework in ways that more clearly assigns responsibilities for each core element of the SLFC support mission.***

- ***Establish a more coherent set of guidelines that create a common understanding among DHS officers for how the quality of SLFC intelligence support can be improved.***

- The Project Team's actions to increase DHS support to the SLFCs immediately in the targeted areas as well as its proposed Action Plan for additional initiatives in the months ahead were designed to bring about these improvements and create a more SLFC-oriented intelligence support enterprise. **(See Appendix A for a summary listing of the specific initiatives we propose as part of the Action Plan.)**

Servicing SLFC Requests for Information

Of the three areas targeted for improvement, SLFC leadership expressed the greatest frustration with the DHS RFI process. Prior to the pilot program, they faced a bewildering array of entry points into DHS depending on the type of request; barriers to engaging DHS intelligence components outside I&A that often have the information they need; and an overly bureaucratic process that took too long to respond.

- The pilot fusion centers want a customer-focused RFI process that reflects the state and local mission, allows them to reach across all DHS components to get the information they need, and pulls out all stops to get them a timely response*.*

  To improve the quality of DHS RFI responses, the Pilot Project Team worked with DHS officers to establish a "single point of service (SPS)" with responsibility for making sure that any RFI submitted from a pilot site receives a timely and appropriate response. This entity, called the Fusion Cell, is composed of officers from both the National Operations Center's (NOC's) Fusion Desk and

Intelligence Watch and Warning (IWW) who are experienced in handling a wide spectrum of RFIs from the SLFCs.

- The Fusion Cell assigns some RFIs for immediate action within the NOC, while those requiring more in-depth analysis are forwarded to Collection Requirements (CR) Division for assignment to I&A divisions, DHS components, or other Intelligence Community (IC) agencies. Four senior analysts from I&A are assigned as customer advocates for each of the pilot sites, poised to take action to resolve any problems that threaten to impede a timely and appropriate response to pilot site RFIs.

- This new framework that DUS-I endorsed has already produced a dramatic increase in the timeliness and quality of the DHS response to pilot site RFIs, a result that has prompted positive feedback from leaders at the pilot sites and a greater appreciation for the intelligence support that DHS can provide to the SLFC mission.

Aligning DHS Analysis to Support SLFC Mission-Critical Needs

SLFC leaders at the pilot sites do not believe that the raw reporting and finished intelligence they currently receive from DHS fully meet their mission-critical needs. The intelligence provided is not sufficiently focused on their unique requirements and the substantive issues that dominate the daily work of their fusion center personnel. Even products that do address the right substantive issues sometimes fail to bring out the operational implications for local and state law enforcement – a focus that is critical for their stakeholders.

Despite a greater attention to SLFC needs, our discussions with I&A officers indicate that support to the Secretary and other senior officials still sometimes dominate decision-making in I&A about what to produce and how to produce it. As a result, DHS has not yet put in place a structured intelligence process that balances the needs of the multiple customers I&A must serve, -- a process that, while still meeting the needs of the Secretary, effectively identifies SLFC requirements for reporting and analysis, produces finished products tailored to those requirements; and collects feedback from the SLFCs on the value of disseminated products.

The Project Team concluded that, given this reality, building a DHS intelligence process focused on the SLFC customer must start with the foundation – an accurate picture of each SLFC's mission-critical intelligence support needs. *Working with senior managers and analysts at each pilot site, the Team developed a limited set of top priority issues that reflects each site's substantive focus for the coming year, a set of issues that we have named "Priority Information Needs" (PINs).*

- These PINs, some of which reflect themes such as threats to critical infrastructure or prison radicalization that are common to many SLFCs, have

been provided to appropriate managers and analysts in I&A as a way of fostering greater dialog with the SLFCs and more direct analyst-to-analyst exchanges.

- As another initiative to align I&A production with SLFC priorities, DUS-I has directed I&A's analytic divisions to provide to I&A representatives at each of the pilot sites a list of their scheduled production so that the SLFCs can see what is being planned and have earlier input into how it can be better focused to meet their needs.

SLFC leaders have indicated that DHS analysis responding to these PINs will provide significant support to their mission. Per the direction of DUS-I, I&A's analytic divisions are already using these PINs to inform their production planning.

DUS-I has tasked the Project Team to expand this effort in the months ahead to create a nationwide set of SLFC PINs that reflects the mission-critical requirements of all SLFCs. Besides focusing on the right issues, it is equally important that the DHS products provided to the SLFCs answer the right questions. Our work indicates that, overwhelmingly, the most important questions for the SLFCs are operationally focused--questions that will assist SLFC stakeholders in making the proper decisions at the street level.

- ***Reporting and analysis to support SLFCs will often look fundamentally different from reporting and analysis crafted to support federal level executives***. As it already does for some issues, I&A should consider producing different product lines when dealing with a topic that has both a national audience as well as a customer set at the state and local level.

- Deepening the dialog among DHS and SLFC analysts can assist I&A to better understand what constitutes its "sweet spot" in analytical support to the SLFCs – that is, the issues that DHS is best suited to answer and how best to present the analysis on those issues.

Our discussions at the pilot sites revealed that the quality of DHS intelligence support in the wake of critical domestic and international homeland security-related incidents is a top priority for SLFC leaders and a key determinant of how they evaluate DHS analytic support. SLFC leaders told us that they need immediate commentary from DHS on such incidents to help them support key stakeholders as they decide whether to redeploy law enforcement resources or take other immediate action.

- ***Based on the feedback we received, the Team identified a "menu" of best practices in supporting SLFCs in the wake of critical incidents. These best practices have been endorsed by SLFC leaders and I&A representatives at the pilot sites as conveying excellent guidelines for DHS support on critical incidents. We suggest CINT consider sharing this draft with the SLFC Customer Advisory Council that was established during the pilot program***

and then adopting those recommendations that best meet the needs of SLFCs during a crisis.

Establishing a Framework for SLFC Support to DHS Information Needs

SLFC leaders at the pilot sites we visited told us they were eager to provide information that could support DHS in its national counterterrorism mission and invited DHS to give them the targeted guidance necessary to stimulate a flow of information from street level law enforcement through the SLFCs to DHS in Washington. *In response to this request, the Project Team worked with representatives in I&A's analytic divisions to compile a limited set of "DHS Priority Information Needs" (DHS PINs) that could guide SLFC efforts to provide information to DHS to support its homeland security mission.*

- Pilot site SLFC leaders have indicated that the set of DHS PINs represent issues on which they are willing and able to share information available to them with DHS. DUS-I has tasked the Project Team to work with SLFC and I&A analysts to identify pathways for pilot sites to provide information and engage in training of SLFC analysts that responds to the DHS PINs.

Enhancing SLFC Open Source Capabilities

Effective exploitation of open source information is essential if SLFC analysts are to carry out their homeland security and crime-fighting missions. *The Project Team found that the ability of pilot site analysts to exploit open source is limited by the lack of training on state-of-the-art exploitation techniques, by restricted access to relevant federal databases, and by the enormous volume of open source products they receive.*

The Project Team concluded that appropriately targeted DHS training and support could dramatically improve SLFCs analysts' ability to exploit open source information.

- The Mobile Team training program planned by the I&A/CR/Open Source Unit (I&A/CR/OS), once implemented, will significantly improve SLFC analysts' ability to exploit available open source information.

- DHS can also assist the SLFCs to cope with the array of open source products they receive by developing value-added open source products and services that integrate and evaluate the information and help SLFCs to separate the wheat from the chaff.

In response to pilot site leaders' request for more open source support, *the Project Team worked with experts in I&A, with the Assistant Deputy Director for National Intelligence for Open Source (ADDNI/OS), and with analysts at the Open Source Center to design a series of actions that will help DHS to jump-start an*

augmented SLFC open source support program. Over the next two months, the Project Team will:

- Complete on-site training at each of the six pilot sites focused on practical tools and methods in collaboration with federal government open source experts. The training team has already designed the training curriculum and conducted the first of these training sessions with analysts from the Commonwealth Fusion Center (CFC) and the Boston Regional Intelligence Center (BRIC) in Massachusetts, and from the Statewide Terrorism and Intelligence Center in Illinois (STIC).

- Work with I&A/OS to create an online open source training regime that will be accessible to SLFCs nationwide

- Work with the senior DNI Advisor for External Outreach to help design an orientation program for SLFC analysts at federal government open source organizations.

Strengthening SLFC Support Structures Established under the Pilot

We believe the actions outlined above can be implemented immediately to lock in initial gains from the pilot program and to extend the program nationwide. However, transforming these successes into a permanent level of enhanced support to SLFCs across the country will, in our view, also require strengthening the existing organizational framework that was established during the pilot program to assist I&A leadership focus appropriate attention and resources on SLFC customers.

Putting in place structures to support SLFCs across the nation is a long-term task. The Project Team believes the structures we propose will provide a solid foundation to begin the process of implementing enhanced SLFC support over the months ahead. The Team intends to work closely with I&A/PM, I&A analytic divisions, and the NOC to implement these initiatives.

To manage RFIs and other day-to-day tactical support, the Team suggests that the CINT consider authorizing an expanded version of the Fusion Cell under PM that will have overall responsibility for handling all RFIs and ensuring that SLFCs receive a timely and appropriate response to their requests.

- In the text of the report we propose a streamlined process for managing RFIs that consolidates authority for assigning all RFIs in PM and integrates ICE, CBP, and other component intelligence offices more effectively into the RFI process.

- DUS-I has mandated that overall authority for handling RFIs be located in I&A/PM, which will have authority for tracking, assigning responsibility, and keeping senior I&A leadership informed. The leadership at the NOC and in the

I&A analytic divisions will need to work with PM as it defines its mission and to ensure a smooth transition as it establishes a nationwide SLFC RFI process.

- We also propose I&A/PM consider deploying a new web-based RFI tracking system. During the pilot program, a rudimentary system was used to track RFIs involving manual entry of data on a spreadsheet. Handling the anticipated increase in volume of SLFC RFIs will be much more difficult without a more streamlined system.

To champion and oversee DHS efforts to align reporting and analysis more effectively with SLFC needs, *the Team proposes that the CINT consider making permanent the SLFC Analytic Production Support Working Group composed of senior analysts from I&A's analytic divisions and other DHS components such as ICE and CBP that was established during the pilot program.* The Working Group could serve as a forum for helping I&A's analytic divisions decide how to better prioritize all of their different responsibilities from meeting the needs of the Secretary, to responding to requests from Congress, to helping SLFCs meet their critical mission requirements.

- The Project Team recommends that PM be tasked with maintaining performance metrics that track how well I&A and DHS finished intelligence production tracks with expressed SLFC needs and providing those metrics to the DHS leadership.

- The Project Team also recommends that PM work with the Project Team to develop a regular process for eliciting feedback from SLFC analysts on DHS finished intelligence products and disseminating that feedback to I&A and DHS analysts.

Reinforcing Senior Leadership Involvement

Beyond implementing the specific steps outlined above, establishing a durable basis for enhanced SLFC support will require a continued, sustained DHS leadership commitment and a process for the CINT to exercise effective oversight. In support of these objectives, CINT might consider

- *Setting forth his vision for taking SLFC support to the next level in a visible, public fashion to get the attention of the workforce and to ensure that DHS officers understand the priority of the SLFC mission*. This initiative could include a memorandum distributed to all analysts and could be followed by an all-hands meeting addressed by the CINT and by the Secretary.

- *Making permanent the SLFC Support Leadership Council that operated informally during the pilot project.* The Council would include senior officers from I&A and other DHS components and would oversee enterprise-wide initiatives to upgrade SLFC support and ensure that administrative, logistical, and substantive support to the SLFCs is effectively integrated.

In the Project Team's view, it will be important for the CINT and the Leadership Council to accurately track how well DHS is succeeding in upgrading the quality of its intelligence support to SLFCs across the range of substantive issues.

- ***The Project Team proposes working with I&A officers and PM Division to develop a set metrics that will enable the Leadership Council to make informed decisions about SLFC support***.

To fully support SLFCs in meeting their mission critical needs, I&A must be able to involve DHS legacy agencies and rest of the IC. With this goal in mind, CINT could consider:

- ***Tasking the Project Team to work with a group of senior officers from I&A and other DHS components to develop a long-term plan for integrating all components of DHS and IC partners into the SLFC Support Mission***

Ultimately it is the customer – SLFC leaders and stakeholders – who will determine whether the CINT's initiative to upgrade SLFC support is succeeding. The Team notes that

- ***The SLFC Customer Advisory Council composed of senior SLFC leaders and stakeholders that DUS-I recently established as the primary state and local advisory group to CINT provides an excellent forum for evaluating the quality of DHS SLFC support and for identifying additional actions that may be necessary.***

III. Introduction

In its role as Executive Agent, I&A is charged with developing, implementing, and coordinating programs and policies across the entire Department that promote and enhance DHS support to SLFCs. Under the direction of DHS' CINT, the Pilot Project Team worked with SLFCs to determine how DHS can better meet the needs of fusion centers in three key areas: PINs, RFIs, and open source support. Six fusion centers in five states were selected by DHS leadership for inclusion in the pilot project:

SLFC Pilot Project Sites		
State	**City**	**Fusion Center Name**
California	Sacramento	Regional Terrorist Threat Analysis Center (RTTAC)
Florida	Tallahassee	Florida Fusion Center (FFC)
Illinois	Springfield	Statewide Terrorism and Intelligence Center (STIC)
Massachusetts	Boston	Commonwealth Fusion Center (CFC) and the Boston Regional Intelligence Center (BRIC)
New York	Albany	New York State Intelligence Center (NYSIC)

The pilot project had two goals: 1) to put in place measures to immediately improve DHS support at six pilot sites, and 2) to develop a set of actions that would enable DHS to better meet the needs of its SLFC partners nationwide.

DHS faced significant challenges in carrying out the CINT's mandate. The fusion centers selected to be part of the pilot project vary widely in their level of development and intelligence capabilities and in the kinds of support they require. Moreover, in trying to increase its information support to SLFCs across the country, DHS has had to work in a rapidly changing landscape in which 34 of 43 fusions centers have opened since 2004 and in which the federal government's own role in supporting the SLFC network has yet to be clearly defined.

Given the complexity of this challenge, the Pilot Team adopted an innovative approach to the task that combined a process of continuing engagement with the pilot sites along with implementation of immediate actions designed to improve DHS support to SLFCs. This approach involved:

- Extensive conversations with the I&A representatives at each site to develop a strategy for the pilot project and the initial site visits.

- Site visits to speak with leaders and line analysts; our focus in these visits was to understand each site's critical missions and key stakeholders--the keys to understanding the types of information support they need from DHS.

- Continuous interaction with I&A representatives and SLFC leaders at each site. We made return visits, arranged for follow-up meetings at DHS headquarters, conducted numerous telephone conferences, and engaged in extensive email contact following the initial visits.

- An ongoing dialog with managers and analysts at DHS headquarters in order to make sure that the initiatives put in place incorporated I&A officers' ideas for enhanced SLFC support.

- Implementing actions approved by DUS-I to quickly enhance DHS support in each of the three areas of support included in the CINT's mandate.

The actions taken during the pilot program, the impact they have had, and recommended next steps form the subject of this report. (See Appendix B for a list of key officials at DHS, at the six pilot sites, and in the Intelligence and Law Enforcement Communities that were consulted as part of this project.)

IV. Responding to the Chief Intelligence Officer's Mandate

The six fusion centers chosen to participate in the pilot program serve a wide variety of customers, including local police officers on the street; executives in the state police; and state, regional, and local government officials from the Governor and Homeland Security Adviser on down. Notwithstanding this diverse customer set, the fundamental reality that emerged was that the day-to-day operations of the SLFCs are focused primarily on tactical, operational issues involving local law enforcement information, rather than strategic, long-term homeland security issues incorporating national intelligence. This focus evolved naturally from the fact that the fusion centers are staffed and run mostly by local law enforcement personnel with operational backgrounds. Furthermore, most of their federal interaction has been with entities such as the FBI that emphasized a more traditional, law enforcement approach to information gathering and analysis.

This tactical focus has been reinforced by a general lack of knowledge of how DHS and the IC can support the SLFC mission. Although their understanding of DHS and federal agencies involved in homeland security has improved since the deployment of I&A representatives at 18 fusion centers nationwide, the SLFC leaders that we talked to during our initial visits to the six pilot sites remained generally skeptical of how essential DHS support was for fulfilling their mission.

- SLFC leaders told the Team that for the most part the information provided to them from DHS has not included a state and local "so what" that addresses issues important to them.

- They were, however, optimistic that mutually productive and supportive relationships between state and local fusion centers and DHS could develop over time.

The leadership at the fusion centers strongly endorsed the idea of the pilot program and fully supported the initiatives taken during it. While offering candid observations of past DHS efforts in each of the three targeted areas, they provided

constructive ideas on how DHS could improve its performance. What follows is a summary of those discussions, a description of the programs put in place to improve DHS support and the impact those programs have had, and a series of recommendation for next steps to lock in pilot program gains and extend the program nationwide.

Creating a Customer-Focused RFI Process

Of the three areas targeted for improvement, SLFC leadership expressed the greatest frustration with the DHS RFI process. Their observations centered around four areas involving:

- Confusing and overly bureaucratic processes for submitting RFIs-- Prior to the pilot program, SLFCs faced a bewildering array of entry points into DHS depending on whether their RFI was deemed intelligence or law-enforcement related, strategic or tactical, formal or informal, or product-related.[1] They disliked the RFI submission form because it was too long and contained fields requiring them to submit proof that they had conducted research on their own, conveying what they considered a lack of trust. Pilot Project Team members were told that the RFI procedures instituted by I&A/CR were based on a model derived from best practices in the US military in which measures were in place to ensure divisions assigned responsibility for responding to RFIs had to do so promptly and in a forthcoming way. However, because CR has no perceived enforcement authority over DHS component agencies or the IC, DHS response times to RFIs have not followed military best practice. SLFC personnel advised that in the law enforcement world, turnaround times must be quick, not weeks or months. Overall, the SLFCs judged that DHS did not treat their information requests with the priority they deserved and thus quickly lost interest in submitting RFIs.

- Inability to engage all DHS Components-- Much of the information that SLFCs seek is in DHS "legacy agencies." SLFCs told us they hoped that they would gain access to this information once I&A representatives arrived on-site, but that components such as ICE have continued to deny RFIs because they judged the information to be operationally sensitive or they did not have the resources.

- Failure to recognize the State SLFC as primary entity for dealing with DHS-- Some state-level SLFCs resented that DHS directly interacted with regional SLFCs *within* their state to answer questions. In their opinion, such interaction undercut their authority, promoted dysfunctional work practices within their states in terms of information sharing, and ignored executive orders by governors designating them as the primary homeland security point of contact not to mention DHS' own stated policy of recognizing a primary fusion center in each state.

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[1] Depending on where an RFI fell on this spectrum, it was the responsibility of the customer to approach the correct DHS component for a response. The Project Team identified at least five different entry points including I&A/CR, I&A/PM, the NOC Fusion Desk, IWW, or one of the 400+ HSIN portals.

- <u>Inconsistent policy with regard to name checks</u>-- SLFC leaders told us that IWW, designated as the focal point for name traces involving *intelligence* information in the RFI process, frequently refused to conduct name searches in IC databases and failed to communicate clearly the reasons for the denial. Our interviews suggest that IWW's restrictive conditions for name checks reflect the fact that DHS/Office of General Counsel (OGC) guidance for allowing name checks involving IC databases remains ill-defined or has not been clearly communicated. SLFC irritation over the IWW position on name traces was exacerbated by the fact that the NOC Fusion Desk, the designated point for name checks against *law enforcement* databases, adopted a much more forward leaning posture and typically responded to queries very quickly. Name checks are a basic investigative tool frequently employed by SLFCs so IWW denials greatly strain relations.

In an effort to address the first of these issues, the Pilot Team, working with NOC and IWW personnel, established a new entity called the Fusion Cell to serve as the primary focal point for handling all pilot site RFIs. Staffed by NOC Fusion Desk and IWW members familiar with dealing with both law enforcement and intelligence questions, it is located on the high side of the NOC. For the first time, both law enforcement and intelligence elements of DHS simultaneously received each RFI and together decided whether the RFI should be handled within the NOC, sent to I&A/CR for assignment to DHS entities or other elements within the IC, or returned to the SLFC for additional information.

- ***Designating the Fusion Cell as the "single point of service" greatly simplified the RFI system for the SLFCs, accelerated response times, and quickly improved accountability and transparency in the RFI process.***

The Pilot Team, at the direction of DUS-I, also worked with I&A leaders to name a group of senior I&A analysts to be responsible for monitoring the new RFI process and for taking actions to resolve any problems that arose. The senior analysts were empowered to place issues affecting his or her assigned site on the agenda for the weekly I&A division managers meeting.

Finally, the Pilot Team took several actions to address the concerns of SLFCs involving the flow of information between state-level and regional fusion centers and procedures for handling name checks. With regard to the former, the Team implemented a process whereby both the state-level and the regional SLFC within a state are "carbon copied" on each others' RFI, and each receives the DHS response. With regard to name checks, the Pilot Team met with members from the Fusion Cell and I&A General Counsel to discuss the legal guidelines. IWW is in the process of developing specific guidelines for handling name checks, which it intends to submit to the General Counsel for approval.

These initiatives to create a more responsive RFI process have resulted in a dramatic increase in the timeliness of responses to RFIs from the five pilot states. Of the 81 RFIs submitted during the first five months of the pilot, 84 percent, have been completed on time or early, with the turnaround time averaging just under five days (see Figure 1 and Table 1.) Field representatives said it often took weeks or months to receive responses to their requests before the pilot.

The new RFI process also has produced a noticeable increase in the volume of RFIs from the pilot sites, a result that pilot I&A representatives attribute to a new SLFC appreciation for how DHS can support their mission and the simplified procedures for submitting requests. Since the Fusion Cell began operations in September, the six pilot sites have submitted 81 RFIs. Extrapolating this figure over a full 12 month period would result in over 200 RFIs. By comparison, CR data covering all 50 states shows that there was 1 RFI in FY05, 6 in FY06 and 103 in FY07 prior to the start of the new process in September.[2]

Pilot Project RFI Status

Figure 1: Project Pilot Status

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[2] By all accounts, a substantial increase in pilot state participation in the RFI process has been achieved since the new pilot process was initiated. It should be noted, however, that this data is not strictly comparable. Prior to the pilot program, the NOC Fusion Desk handled "law enforcement" RFIs from state and locals through informal channels such as phone calls and HSIN. Examples of such RFIs included name traces, security threat phone calls, requests for help with HSIN database entries, and fusion reports. While many of these items would not meet CR's definition of what an RFI is, they meet the pilot definition, as all SLFC questions are considered to be RFIs for the pilot. Prior to the pilot program, the Fusion Desk reported handling several hundred name traces from all 50 states and local authorities, but the data was not broken out by state.

Table 1: RFI Response Time

Average Request/Response Time in Days		
	Request	Response
Boston BRIC	1.0	1.0
Massachusetts CFC	11.8	1.9
Florida FFC	22.2	10.2
Illinois STIC	6.9	4.9
New York NYSIC	12.6	9.2
Sacramento RTTAC	10.5	1.1
Average	10.8	4.7

Aligning DHS Analysis to Support SLFC Mission-Critical Needs

Our discussions at the pilot sites revealed that SLFC leaders do not believe that, as currently structured, the raw reporting and finished intelligence they receive from DHS always meet their mission-critical needs. In many cases, the flow of intelligence support is not sufficiently focused on the unique requirements of state and local law enforcement or the substantive issues that dominate the daily work of fusion center personnel. Products they receive that do address the right substantive issues often are not written to bring out the operational implications for local and state law enforcement – a focus that is critical for their stakeholders.

- The SLFCs are largely oriented toward tactical, day-to-day issues informed by law enforcement-derived information rather than by strategic counterterrorism and homeland security tasks that depend on national-level intelligence. DHS reporting and analysis, in turn, are largely tailored to the needs of federal level customers.

The Project Team concluded that, given this reality, the work to build a DHS intelligence process focused on the SLFC customer must start with the foundation – building an accurate picture of each SLFC's mission-critical intelligence support needs. *We determined that the best place to start was to build a short, focused list of mission-critical priority issues for each SLFC that reflects the Center's substantive focus for the coming year, a set of issues that we have named "Priority Information Needs" (PINs).*

Prior to the CINT's initiative, very few SLFCs across the nation had developed a list of PINs that reflected their key areas of ongoing substantive focus. For its part, DHS had not surveyed SLFCs for their PINs, nor were they generally offered to DHS when they existed. The net result of this was that although SLFCs routinely received hundreds of DHS products in any given month, most were written for federal policymakers; few were tailored to their needs. Thus, DHS products often failed to focus on the issues

central to the pilot sites' mission. They often lacked the state and local "so what," that is, analysis of how overseas and domestic developments discussed in finished products affected the local environment and the operational implications of these developments for local decisionmakers.

SLFC leaders told us that better intelligence support from DHS was particularly critical to their mission in wake of a terrorist incident or other homeland security event or crisis. Although the pilot sites reported that DHS support during the London/Glasgow and Nebraska shooting incidents was much improved, they said that DHS often was silent in the early stages of other crises when their stakeholders were eager to receive immediate information about the event, the possible terrorism nexus, and the local operational implications. Given a tradeoff between timeliness, completeness, and accuracy, pilot site officers said that it was most important that they receive something quickly during the early stages of a crisis.

While the focus of discussions at the pilot sites was on how DHS could better support SLFC information needs, nearly every pilot site told the Pilot Team that they would welcome input from DHS leaders on how they in turn could better support DHS information needs. Managers and analysts at the pilot sites said that if DHS shared its information needs, those needs would inform their own priorities. They told us they did not want a huge compendium of hundreds of needs but something short and dynamic; for instance, a short quarterly summary that highlighted four or five needs that are a high priority for DHS and on which local law enforcement agencies would be well positioned to report.

Against this background, the Pilot Team helped pilot sites develop a list of PINs for DHS use; worked with DHS to develop a short, focused set of PINs for SLFC use; and developed a "menu" of best practices involving support to SLFCs during a critical incident based on our discussions with SLFC leaders. Each of these actions is elaborated upon below.

Formulating SLFC PINs

Working with key stakeholders and senior managers and analysts at each of the pilot sites, the Pilot Team developed a prioritized list of information needs that reflects each site's key areas of ongoing substantive focus for the coming year. While some themes varied by site, five common themes emerged: domestic extremist groups, prison radicalization, threats to critical infrastructure, international terrorist activity, and gang activity**.**

Some of the questions included in the PINs involving specific terrorist investigations appear to be part of FBI's mandate, with DHS having little to contribute. Others, however, clearly play to I&A strengths. For example, all of the pilot sites indicated that they were interested in receiving regular updates on the international

threat environment and what it might mean to them locally.[3] Similarly, analysts at SLFCs told us they were interested in knowing the tactics employed by terrorists using IEDs overseas and what lessons might be applied to first responders in their area. At the most basic level, the SLFCs were asking I&A to supply them with analysis that would better inform their operational decisions.

- ***The SLFC PINs for the first time give I&A a basis for focusing its collection, research, and analysis on the articulated needs of the SLFCs and not just as a byproduct of its work for national level customers.***

To make sure that momentum from this effort is not lost, DUS-I has instructed I&A analysts to enter into dialogue with their SLFC counterparts on the specific questions they need to be addressing as part of their research.

- As a first step in this process, DUS-I has directed I&A analytic divisions to provide to I&A representatives at each pilot site a list of I&A scheduled production so that the SLFCs can see what is being planned, determine whether the fusion center has the ability to contribute to the report, and have early input into how it can be better focused to meet their needs.

- DUS-I also has instructed senior managers and analysts from I&A analytic divisions to take in account SLFC PINS in formulating their research plans in the months ahead and they have already begun to do so.

- SLFC leaders have indicated that DHS analysis responding to these PINs will provide significant support to their mission.

- DUS-I has tasked the Project Team to expand this effort in the months ahead to create a nationwide set of SLFC PINs that reflects the mission-critical requirements of all SLFCs.

Communicating DHS PINs

SLFC leaders at the pilot sites told us they were eager to provide intelligence that could support DHS in its homeland security mission and invited DHS to give them the targeted guidance necessary to stimulate a flow of intelligence from street level law enforcement through the SLFCs to DHS in Washington.

- ***In response to this request the Project Team worked with representatives in I&A's analytical divisions to draft a limited set of DHS PINs that could***

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[3] An example of the type of analysis the SLFCs said they wanted, but were not getting, involved the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on international terrorism issued last summer. In the NIE it was stated that over a dozen plots had been disrupted in the United States since the September 11 attacks. What the SLFCs were looking for in this report, but did not find, was an analysis of any patterns or trends that cut across all of the incidents. Were all of the plotters trained locally or abroad? If the latter, what type of credentials did they use to enter the country and were they legitimate? Such information would have assisted their operational decision making and how they pursued suspected terrorists in their own area.

> *guide SLFC homeland security intelligence reporting efforts and inform the work of I&A.*

This draft set of DHS PINs has been circulated to the pilot SLFCs, which have confirmed that they represent the type of DHS information needs they can support. Per the direction of DUS-I, the Project Team will work with SLFC analysts and I&A officers to develop an effective mechanism for SLFCs to submit information responding to DHS PINs.

Supporting SLFCs during Critical Incidents

SLFC leaders view DHS support during a significant domestic or international incident as one of their most crucial needs, as their stakeholders expect immediate analysis of the local implications of such events when they are reported in the media. Pilot site officers offered suggestions on the type of support DHS could provide to better meet their needs. The Team assembled the SLFC suggestions and developed a "menu" of actions that summarizes what the SLFCs assess to be "best practices" in critical incident support. It includes:

- **Making the earliest possible notification when a critical incident occurs** (e.g., teleconference, DHS statement, quick distribution of CINT notes) so that fusion centers can confirm that DHS is following the situation, begin to take appropriate actions within their areas of jurisdiction, and keep stakeholders informed.

- **Using a standardized notification mechanism for distributing critical information** that ensures all localities are notified and updated simultaneously. One possible vehicle might be the Homeland Security State and Local Intelligence Community of Interest network (HS-SLIC), an unclassified network on which 32 states and over 1,000 intelligence professionals--more than half of which are state and local officials--currently collaborate. Until HS-SLIC has participation from all 50 states, an alternative mechanism will also need to be used.

- **Creating a comprehensive critical incident information distribution list** that not only includes I&A representatives in the field but also SLFC members in all 50 states. This list must be continually updated and include multiple members per state and SLFC so that notifications do not hinge on one or two people who may be out of the office that day.

- **Re-releasing immediately previously disseminated products pertinent to the critical incident.**

- **Tailoring information provided during critical incidents to SLFC needs.** The information should be concise, actionable when possible, and include indicators that may be put into practical use on the street by local law enforcement.

- **Preparing "off the shelf" intelligence products that address various types of critical incidents** (such as biological, chemical, or nuclear attacks, school shootings, etc.) so that when an incident occurs, the material could be forwarded to SLFCs nationwide immediately.

- **Ensuring that any analysis following a critical incident includes a "lessons learned"** and the operational implications for state and local authorities of those lessons.

- **Issuing a concluding report** noting that the incident is over or no longer involves a major threat.

SLFC leaders and I&A representatives at the pilot sites have reviewed this set of actions and told the Pilot Team that it captures fully the type of support they are looking for from DHS. The Team recommends that the SLFC Customer Advisory Group also review this list and advise CINT on which steps are most important for SLFCs to meet their mission critical needs and should be implemented immediately, and which are less critical and thus, can be implemented over the longer term.

Buttressing SLFC Open Source Capabilities

The Project Team discussed with SLFC managers the role that open source information plays in their operations and followed up these discussions with meetings and teleconferences with open source practitioners at each of the pilot sites. SLFC requests for support fell into two broad categories involving:

- Increased open source training and access to federal online databases.

- Help with sorting through the large volume of open source products they receive.

During our talks, five of the six pilot SLFCs told us they had received no open source training from federal agencies and only limited training elsewhere.[4] Most analysts learned open source techniques by doing and utilized commercial search engines and online databases.

- We were told that I&A/CR/OS is planning a major initiative to develop and deploy Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) designed to meet the training needs of SLFCs, but that this effort would likely take two years to stand up.

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[4] Of the six pilot SLFCs, the NYSIC has developed the most advanced open source program aimed at answering both ad hoc questions and addressing issues of a more permanent nature. Approximately half of NYSIC analysts have attended formal open source training offered locally by the DNI/Open Source Center, and techniques and perspectives gained through this training have been applied to operations.

Along with a need for more open source training, another common theme is that SLFCs would benefit from receiving fewer, more tailored open source products.[5] Each of the pilot SLFCs struggles with the large number of open source products it receives from DHS, other state and local sources, and the private sector. At three SLFCs, the analysts estimated that they receive a dozen or more open source products each day, largely containing redundant information and little analysis. In at least one case, this glut of open source products has caused local analysts to ignore such products. In fact, of the six pilot sites, only the NYSIC has established a process whereby an analyst is assigned to consistently review such incoming products and internally distribute them as warranted.

In response to SLFC requests for increased open source support, the Pilot Team engaged open source analysts at DHS and in the DNI's Open Source Center and took the following actions:

- Developed an onsite training program.

- Discussed and received preliminary approval from the DNI's Senior Advisor for Outreach for Open Source for establishing an orientation program for SLFCs at federal open source facilities.

- Worked with I&A/IM to design a system in which a tailored, daily email is sent to each pilot site that pinpoints recent postings to HSIN-SLIC that are of direct relevance to the sites based on a series of key terms the SLFC provides.

In an effort to provide onsite training at each of the pilot sites, the Team met with representatives of I&A/CR/OS, the DNI, and the Open Source Center to discuss what topics should be covered and what such training would hope to accomplish. We agreed that such training should accomplish two goals:

- First, the course should present information on open source tools and methods intended to be of immediate, pragmatic value to open source practitioners at the pilot sites.

- Second, feedback collected from the participating sites should be integrated into a curriculum for practitioners at other SLFCs. In particular, this information should inform the MTT concept articulated by I&A/CR/OS.

In line with these objectives, the Pilot Team, working with the DNI's Open Source Center and I&A/CR/OS, developed a list of topics to be covered at each SLFC and identified a team of trainers. The proposed training syllabus then was forwarded to the

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[5] A small contingent of I&A analysts search government and non-governmental websites for documents of perceived relevance to state and local stakeholders. No formal criteria have been established, however, for what constitutes material responsive to a state or local need, and comparatively few products are identified.

SFLCs who confirmed that the proposed topics were of direct relevance to them. Subsequently, training sessions have been conducted for analysts at the CFC, BRIC and STIC and their feedback has been highly positive. Training at the other pilot sites is scheduled to be completed during the first quarter of 2008.

Along with conducting training onsite, the Pilot Team met with the DNI's Senior Advisor for Outreach for Open Source to explore the possibility of bringing SLFC analysts to federal open source facilities for orientation and training. She agreed that such a program would be valuable, depending on available funding. The Pilot Team confirmed with state and local analysts that federal orientation would be valued, and is following up with this proposal.

V. Next Steps

The success of the pilot program over the last six months is a tribute to actions DUS-I has mandated or approved, as well as to I&A managers and analysts who are committed to enhancing intelligence support to the SLFCs..

- ***Moving forward, the most urgent priority is to lock in the enhanced level of SLFC support and increased customer satisfaction that the pilot program has produced.***

I&A representatives assigned to the pilot SLFCs are unanimous in their concern that I&A will lose significant credibility if the processes for handling RFIs, SLFC PINs, and, open source support return to the pre-pilot state, as analysts at their sites are starting to view DHS and I&A as the primary source for both raw and finished intelligence.

- ***This improvement in reputation, responsiveness, and overall information sharing helps to fulfill the CINT's pledge to the six pilot sites at the start of this program that I&A would increase the quality of its support.***

We propose in this section a series of initiatives that we believe will position I&A to consolidate these initial successes and take SLFC support to the next level on a nationwide basis.

Consolidating Pilot Project Gains

RFIs

Successfully managing RFIs from over 50 SLFCs will require fast and accurate assignment coupled with a transparent tracking system to keep up with demand and to ensure accountability. To solidify current gains in the RFI process and to extend the program nationwide, we suggest that CINT consider taking the following actions, all of which the Pilot Team is prepared to assist with:

- ***Immediately extend to all states the Single Point of Service concept for handling RFIs that resides in PM per DUS-I mandate..***

- ***Deploy a web-based system for submitting, assigning, and tracking the expected surge in RFIs as the program is implemented across the nation.***

- ***Develop a set of training requirements for I&A representatives in the field in concert with SLPO to enable them to better respond to SLFC RFIs on-site and conduct such training as necessary.***

- ***Make it easier for SLFCs to conduct their own name checks and better define for them under what conditions NOC/IWW will assist their efforts.***

Some of the responsibilities for assigning non-pilot site RFIs for action currently reside within CR's RFI unit and would need to be transferred.

- DUS-I has mandated that PM be the focal point for SLFC RFIs nationwide and will have responsibility for tasking and tracking all RFIs within I&A, as well as keeping senior I&A leadership informed of how this process is working.

- The Project Team will work with the leadership at the NOC and in the I&A analytic divisions on operational details to ensure a smooth transition of this activity to PM Division and will support PM as it defines its mission and develops a process to support a nationwide SLFC RFI activity.

- In the interim, DUS-I has asked the Project Team to ensure that pilot program structures remain in place and operational until the follow-on actions proposed in the Action Plan are in place.

I&A also will need to develop a better system for tracking and monitoring the much higher RFI volume the SLFCs will produce as the pilot program is extended nationwide. Under the pilot program, tracking RFIs was accomplished using a rudimentary system involving the manual entry of data into a spreadsheet. The Team proposes helping I&A deploy a new, web-based RFI tracking system that would make it easier for SLFCs to submit RFIs, increase transparency across the enterprise, and improve management accountability within I&A.

Another critical element in extending the RFI process nationwide is to ensure that I&A representatives at SLFCs have the proper training and access to the databases they need.

- The I&A representatives, properly equipped, can minimize the impact of SLFC requirements on I&A's analytic units by working to satisfy as many requirements as possible before they reach DHS and by helping SLFC officers to craft RFIs that provide maximum value to the SLFC mission with a minimum of impact on DHS resources.

Based on our interviews, however, I&A representatives need additional training to play this RFI management linchpin role. To properly equip them, the Team proposes working with the SLPO to:

- ***Develop an enhanced training program for prospective and currently serving I&A representatives. In our discussions, the fusion center representatives mentioned a variety of issues that such training could cover including TECs, FBI systems, open source exploitation tools, IC name trace process, and HSDN navigation among others.***

- ***Develop a list of databases to which I&A representatives need access in order to carry out their role as "first responders" to SLFC RFIs. On the basis of this list, develop a program to provide I&A representatives access to and training on those databases.***

It is especially important that SLFC representatives be given access to and training on databases that are used for name checks. Despite hosting many important capabilities, the current HSDN and HSIN configurations do not give I&A representatives access to any federal intelligence databases such as those available at the NOC. The overwhelming majority of databases used to conduct name checks reside on JWICS, making them unavailable to almost all the I&A officers posted at the SLFCs. As a result, RFIs regarding specific name checks must be forwarded to the NOC*.*

- ***In the next phase of the project, the Team proposes to catalog the various law enforcement and intelligence information databases used for conducting name checks. We also propose working with the SLPO to provide the field representatives whatever training is needed on how to access them.***

Building on these immediate actions, the new RFI process will need to take advantage of each I&A asset in the chain of responsibility between the requesting SLFC and the I&A division handling the request if it is to manage the higher RFI volume the 50 state SLFCs will produce. If CINT and DUS-I agree, the new, fully implemented RFI process would include at least four tiers of responders.

- Tier 1: As noted above, deployed I&A representatives would serve as local RFI screeners and first responders. The representative's response capability would be roughly proportional to his or her ability to access classified networks, intelligence databases, message traffic, raw and finished intelligence products, and other information sources at the federal level.

- Tier 2: RFIs forwarded to PM would be reviewed and logged into the new RFI tracking system. RFIs related to name checks, previously published finished

intelligence products, and other readily available DHS Headquarters information would be handled here or by analysts and watch standers in the NOC/IWW.

- Tier 3: RFIs requiring new or refined analytic production will be tasked by PM to the I&A division best prepared to deal with the subject matter. Analyst(s) will be assigned by name and given a due date for the RFI response. PM will stay in frequent contact with the designated analyst(s) and final responses will be routed back to the requesting SLFC by PM.

- Tier 4: RFIs needing analytic support from IC partners outside of DHS will be assigned to CR, which will manage the external coordination required to develop RFI responses that meet the needs of the SLFCs.

Figure 2: RFI Response Model – (Volume vs. Complexity)

PINs

The development of a set of PINs at the pilot sites represents an important milestone, providing I&A managers for the first time with a basis for focusing the Office's research on issues of specific interest to SLFCs. To build on this effort, the Project Team recommends that CINT consider tasking I&A to take the following actions in the months ahead with support from the Project Team. Most of these initiatives build on actions already underway. Specifically, we suggest I&A:

- ***Develop a national set of PINs that reflect SLFC needs.***

- ***Task I&A analytic divisions to develop a process for using the national set of SLFC PINs to drive their production planning.***

- ***Develop a set of metrics to track how well DHS analytic production tracks with SLFC needs and a process to collect feedback from SLFCs on disseminated DHS products.***

- ***Consider which actions can be taken immediately that are not already in place to support SLFCs during critical incidents.***

- ***Finalize the list of DHS PINs on which SLFCs would be asked to report. The results of this effort could be presented to the national SLFC conference which is scheduled for March 2008.***

National Set of SLFC PINs

The Team recommends that in the months ahead the effort to identify individual SLFC PINs be expanded to create a nationwide set of SLFC PINs that reflect their mission critical needs. To do this, analysts at each fusion center will need to be surveyed on the specific topics for which they have ongoing information needs, a task that could be accomplished either through additional site visits, conference calls, or a survey instrument. I&A representatives, where they are available, can facilitate this process. Once in hand, this national set of SLFC PINs would form the basis for establishing requirements to which the FBI and the rest of the IC, not just DHS/I&A, could respond.

With a national set of SLFC PINs in hand – in effect a guide that DHS can use to align its finished intelligence with SLFC needs – it will be important for I&A to put in place a process to make sure that SLFC needs in fact are used to drive production planning.

- DUS-I has mandated that each analytic division in I&A take responsibility for developing procedures that ensure that its production of finished intelligence responds to SLFC analytical needs. In response to this directive, I&A's production divisions are in the process of developing a research program that directly takes into account SLFC needs.

To build on this initiative, the Project Team recommends that PM be tasked with maintaining performance metrics that measure how well I&A and DHS finished intelligence production in fact tracks with expressed SLFC needs. PM could provide those metrics to the DHS leadership on a regular basis.

Critical Incident Support

I&A representatives and SLFC stakeholders have told the Project Team that they see enhanced procedures for support during critical incidents as vital to their future relationship with DHS. To respond to this priority, we recommend that

- *CINT share the set of actions that SLFC leaders have said they would like DHS to take during a critical incident with the SLFC Leadership Advisory Council to get their input on which actions are most important..*

- *Once this has been accomplished, the Project Team suggests CINT consider having the Project Team draft a memo that could be sent to all SLFC stakeholders nationwide, detailing what actions will be taken during a critical incident and inviting comment and feedback.*

Finalizing the List of DHS PINs

Similarly, we suggest that I&A incorporate feedback from SLFCs on the draft set of DHS Priority Information Needs to finalize the set of DHS PINs on which SLFCs will be asked to report local information. The Pilot Team proposes working with the I&A representatives at each pilot site to make sure that information available at the pilot sites is put into the proper format and returned to I&A, and that feedback on the usefulness of such information is conveyed back to the provider. Beyond engaging analysts at the pilot sites, the Project Team could work with I&A divisions to develop a presentation that could be given to the National Conference of State and Local Fusion Centers in March 2008 detailing the list of topics DHS is interested having SLFCs report on and the methods for getting this information back to DHS.

Open Source Support

SLFC managers and analysts at the pilot sites have strongly endorsed the proposed onsite open source training as an example of what DHS can and should be doing to help support their mission. Beyond this initial training, the Project Team recommends that CINT take the following actions:

- *Proceed as quickly as possible with the deployment of Mobile Training Teams.*

- *Create an online open source training regime that will be accessible to SLFCs nationwide.*

- *Establish a prototype interactive open source monitoring service at a limited number of SLFC sites.*

We strongly endorse I&A's plan to establish MTTs composed of two to three open source practitioners who would be charged with providing onsite support to SLFCs nationwide, including providing training and consultation upon request. According to I&A/CR/OS, current plans call for these teams to be deployed in two years, but our discussions with SLFC managers indicate that they need and want this training now. *As a way to accelerate implementation of the MTT concept, the Project Team proposes working with I&A/CR/OS to help staff and support these MTTs in order to field them immediately.*

- Over the longer term, CINT might consider deploying a small cadre of open source representatives to select SLFCs who would be charged with implementing best practices at fusion centers around the country.

In addition to onsite training, the project team also recommends that I&A/OS institute an online training program to provide foundational open source training, the general concept of which I&A/OS has endorsed in its discussion with the project team on how best to increase support to SLFCs. Although advanced concepts in open source will likely require direct personal teaching by the MTT, fundamental topics such as the existence of the "surface" and "deep webs," and the value of such technologies such as RSS aggregators can be taught via secure, web- based courses. By initiating such an online training program, I&A can economically develop and offer specific training, asynchronously, to any class of students desired nationwide. Moreover, if successful, the open source courses offered online by I&A could form the basis of an expanded curriculum of online training intended for broad audiences of SLFC stakeholders, covering topics such as basic analytic techniques.

Finally, in response to SLFCs' expressed frustration with the volume of material they receive and the dearth of tailored, analytic open source products, the Pilot Team is prepared to help develop and to work with I&A/CR/OS to test a proof-of-concept Open Source Monitoring Service at one or more willing SLFCs. During the trial period, the product manager would solicit feedback in order to make adjustments in the information, analysis, or format to address the specific needs of the recipients and to gauge the amount of effort and staffing that would be required to expand this Monitoring Service to the broader SLFC community.

Measuring Progress

I&A leadership will need to be able to monitor a set of high quality performance metrics in order to evaluate progress on implementing the CINT's vision of enhanced SLFC support in the months ahead. The Project Team recommends that it:

- Work with I&A analysts and field representatives to develop a simple one-page customer survey tool to be completed by SLFC leaders once a quarter.

- Work with I&A personnel to develop a comprehensive set of quantitative and qualitative measures to monitor the quality and timeliness of DHS responses to SLFC RFIs, the responsiveness of DHS reporting and analysis to SLFC PINs, and the quality of DHS open source support to SLFCs.

In addition, the Project Team recommends that CINT consider having PM Division serve as I&A's executive agent for SLFC Customer Feedback. The Pilot Project Team could work with PM to produce a periodic report for the CINT and I&A leaders summarizing customer feedback and tracking trends in performance metrics.

Strengthening Pilot Program Structures to Support a Nationwide SLFC Program

The actions outlined above can be implemented immediately to lock in initial gains from the pilot program and to extend the program nationwide. Transforming these successes into a permanent level of enhanced support to SLFCs across the country will, in our view, also require strengthening the organizational framework that was established during the first phase of the pilot program to assist I&A leadership in focusing appropriate attention and resources on SLFC customers, while continuing to carry out other critical missions. To accomplish these goals, we propose CINT and DUS-I consider adopting an organizational framework consisting of three elements:

- A *SLFC Support Leadership Council* to oversee the SLFC support effort

- A *SLFC Analytic Production Support Working Group* to oversee the effort to align DHS production with SLFC requirements

- An *SLFC Customer Advisory Council* to offer the CINT customer feedback on the program

SLFC Support Leadership Council--The *Leadership Council* could be chaired by the CINT or one of his senior deputies and might include the Deputy Under Secretary for Operations, DUS-I, and the Assistant Deputy Under Secretary for External Communications, as well as senior leaders from all DHS components that play a critical role in SLFC support. The Council would meet regularly, perhaps quarterly, to review the progress of efforts to upgrade the quality of SLFC support across the DHS enterprise, review performance metrics, take action to remove obstacles, and propose new initiatives. The Council will be a critical element in the ability of the CINT to assure an integrated SLFC support program that cuts across administrative, logistical, and substantive support issues.

SLFC Analytic Production Support Working Group--The *Working Group* would be made up of senior analysts appointed as "SLFC referents" by each analytic division in I&A and by other DHS component intelligence entities that play a key role in SLFC support. The Analytic Production Support Working Group would provide advice and recommendations to I&A's production divisions, to DHS component intelligence offices, and to the Leadership Council on steps to further enhance the quality of DHS analytical support to SLFCs. Its first task would be to assist I&A analytic divisions and other DHS component production offices to develop an intelligence process centered on responding to the needs of the SLFCs.

SLFC Customer Advisory Council-- Ultimately, it is the SLFC customer that will determine whether the enhanced SLFC support effort is successful. The SLFC Advisory Council composed of senior SLFC leaders and stakeholders that DUS-I recently established as the primary advisory group to CINT provides an excellent forum for evaluating the quality of SLFC support and for identifying additional actions that may be necessary.

Table 2: Proposed Organizational Framework for Enhanced SLFC Support		
Organization	**Composition**	**Role**
SLFC Support Leadership Council	CINT, I&A senior managers, senior officers from DHS components	Meets quarterly to oversee and champion the SLFC program, map progress, and propose new initiatives
SLFC Analytic Production Support Working Group	SLFC referents from each I&A Division, with additional members from other DHS components critical SLFC support..	Shares best practices in supporting SLFCs, advises Leadership Council and I&A Divisions on steps to align analytic production with SLFC needs.
SLFC Customer Advisory Council	Senior officials from SLFCs and SLFC stakeholders who are primary consumers of DHS support.	Meets quarterly to review metrics on the quality of DHS support to SLFCs and to advise the CINT and DUS-I on possible initiatives.

Communicating CINT's Vision to the DHS Workforce

To signal the critical importance of the SLFC support mission to the workforce, we recommend that CINT consider taking the following additional actions to communicate his vision to the workforce:

- Disseminate a memorandum to all hands in I&A and DHS component intelligence entities discussing the results of the pilot and outlining CINT's vision for DHS support to SLFCs based on the recommendations contained in this report.

- Convene an all hands meeting at which CINT and Secretary Chertoff discuss the urgency of implementing enhanced SLFC support across the organization and some of the specific actions that will be taken.

- To underscore the DHS-wide scope of the mission, this all-hands meeting should include key personnel from TSA, CBP, ICE, and other DHS components and it could be carried by VTC to the field.

As the Pilot Team's interviews in Washington and the field showed, prior to the pilot the quality of DHS support to SLFCs was limited by conflicting priorities and disagreements about the importance of the SLFC support mission. The Project Team believes that such high visibility steps by the Secretary and CINT would underscore the importance of the SLFC mission and create an even greater commitment to DHS-SLFC partnership among the workforce.

Integrating DHS Components and IC Partners into the SLFC Support Mission

To fully support SLFCs in meeting their mission critical needs, I&A must involve DHS legacy agencies and the rest of the IC. Given the different missions, resources,

and priorities of the various entities, accomplishing this goal will not be easy and will require time. Thus, the Pilot Team recommends as a final initiative that CINT consider tasking the Project Team to work with a group of senior officers from I&A, as well as from other DHS components and IC agencies, to develop a long-term plan for integrating all components of DHS and IC partners into the SLFC support mission that might be dubbed "Road Map for Enhanced DHS Support." The plan could include:

- Developing MOUs with key IC agencies whose input DHS will need to ensure enhanced support to SLFCs. These MOUs would formalize and clarify the types of support that DHS will seek and the procedures that will be used to elicit that support. .

- Designating POCs for SLFC support in key IC agencies. The POCs would serve as a champion for SLFC interests in his or her agency and act as an "enforcer" to ensure that the agency gives appropriate priority to the SLFC support mission.

- Drafting additional recommendations for integrating all DHS intelligence entities into a seamless enterprise-wide SLFC support effort.

- This initiative to better integrate DHS legacy agencies and IC partners could start with a pilot program designed to put in place a process for integrating an individual DHS component such as CBP or IC agency such as FBI into the enhanced SLFC support structure.

VI. Appendix A: Proposed Action Plan for Enhanced SLFC Support

The following is a summary of proposed actions to expand DHS information support nationwide. The Team recommends that CINT consider adopting these items, all of which it is prepared to support:

RFIs

1. Extend the Single Point of Service concept for RFIs immediately to all states.

2. Consolidate authority within PM division for assigning RFIs to appropriate I&A analytic divisions for response. .

3. Deploy a web-based system for submitting, assigning, and tracking RFIs to aid transparency and efficiency.

4. Develop a set of training requirements for I&A representatives in the field in concert with SLPO to increase their ability to handle and respond to RFIs on-site and conduct such training as necessary.

5. Develop a list of databases to which I&A representatives need access in order to carry out their duties as "first responders" to SLFC RFIs. On the basis of this list, develop a program to provide I&A representatives access to and training on those databases.

PINs

6. Develop a national set of SLFC PINs that reflect critical mission needs that can be supported by DHS reporting and analysis. Use these PINs to expand analytic exchanges between SLFC and I&A analysts and to drive I&A production planning.

7. Develop an agreed set of actions to guide DHS intelligence support to SLFCs in the wake of significant terrorist acts and other critical homeland security incidents.

8. Create a list of DHS PINs on which SLFCs will be asked to report. Work with I&A/PM to develop procedures for getting this information back to DHS, including an HIR report writing course for SLFC analysts.

Open Source Support

9. Complete initial open source training for each pilot site by March 2008.

10. Deploy the new Mobile Training Team as a follow-on to this effort. To speed up the process, the Team proposes working with I&A/CR/OS to help staff and support these MTT.

11. Create an online open source training program for SLFCs nationwide. The program will be designed to allow I&A to offer specific training, asynchronously, to any class of SLFC analysts or stakeholders nationwide.

Performance Measures

12. Develop a simple one-page customer survey tool on DHS SLFC support to be completed by SLFC leaders or I&A representatives once a quarter.

13. Designate an entity in PM Division to serve as I&A's Executive Agent for SLFC Customer Feedback and to produce a periodic report on that feedback.

14. Authorize the Project Team to work with I&A representatives and PM Division to develop a proposed set of performance metrics that I&A leadership can use to monitor the progress of efforts to upgrade the quality of SLFC support.

Organizational Structures

15. Make permanent the SLFC Analytic Production Support Working Group composed of senior I&A analysts and senior representatives from DHS components to build an intelligence production process focused on SLFC PINs and to expand SLFC-DHS analytic exchanges.

16. Task the SLFC Customer Advisory Council composed of select SLFC leaders and senior SLFC stakeholders that DUS-I recently established to meet regularly to provide CINT and the Leadership Council an accurate reflection of the customer's point of view.

Integration of IC Partners

17. Develop MOUs with key IC agencies whose input DHS will need to ensure enhanced support to SLFCs.

18. Designate POCs for SLFC support in key IC agencies that would serve as champions for SLFC interests in his or her agency and act as "enforcers" to ensure that their agencies give appropriate priority to the SLFC support mission.

19. Complete an MOU with the FBI that clarifies the role the FBI and DHS each plays in SLFC support so that RFIs that require input from both agencies can be promptly addressed.

Making SLFC Intelligence Support an Enterprise-Wide Priority

20. Disseminate a memorandum to all hands discussing the results of the pilot and outlining future plans for DHS support to SLFCs based on the recommendations contained in this report.

21. Convene an all hands meeting at which the CINT and the Secretary discuss the urgency of implementing enhanced SLFC support across the organization.

22. Task a group of senior officers from I&A and other DHS components to develop a long-range plan for additional actions beyond those recommended in this report designed to thoroughly integrate CBP, ICE, and other legacy intelligence units into SLFC support.

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VII. Appendix B: Officials Consulted During the Pilot Project

Pilot Site	Name	Title
**TABLE B1:** **Major SLFC Members Consulted for the Pilot Project**	

Pilot Site	Name	Title
BRIC	Earl Perkins	Director; Deputy Superintendant, Boston Police Department (BPD)
	Carl Walter	Director of Analysis
	Harry Cataldo	Lieutenant, BPD Bureau of Field Services
	Kevin McGoldrick	BRIC Supervisor; Sgt. Detective
	Dan Coleman	BRIC Supervisor; Sgt. Detective
CFC	Major Dermot Quinn	Director
	Rich Lane	Deputy Director and Executive Officer; Lieutenant
FFC	Jennifer Pritt	Assistant Special Agent in Charge for Domestic Security
	Rick Swearingen	Special Agent Supervisor for Domestic Security
	Keith Wilmer	Special Agent Supervisor for Criminal Intelligence
	Chris Stuck	Senior Management Analyst Supervisor for the Counterterrorism Intelligence Center
	Kristi Gordon	Senior Management Analyst Supervisor for the Florida Investigative Support Center
	Kristi Manzi	Senior Management Analyst Supervisor for the Financial Crime Analysis Center
	Barry Lindquist	Inspector
NYSIC	Thomas Fresenius	Director; Lt. Colonel, New York State Police (NYSP)
	Douglas Keyer	Acting Director at the time, now Deputy Director; Captain, NYSP
	Robert Poisson	Deputy Director; Lieutenant, NYSP
	Michael Lair	Deputy Director; Lieutenant, NYSP
	Bob Leary	Border Intelligence Unit Chief; Senior Investigator, NYSP
	Tim Parry	Counter Terrorism Center; Senior Investigator, NYSP
	Mike Beckman	Supervisory Analyst, Counter Terrorism Center
Sacramento RTTAC	Tim Johnstone	RTTAC Commander; Lieutenant
	Brian Banning	RTTAC Deputy Commander; Lieutenant
	Kurt Carpenter	FBI Intelligence Analyst detailed to the RTTAC
	Derek DeWaal	FBI Intelligence Analyst detailed to the RTTAC
STIC	David Jocson	Chief; Lieutenant, Illinois State Police (ISP)
	Dora Tyrrell	Deputy Chief
	Kevin Eack	Senior Terrorism Advisor; Inspector, ISP
	Aaron Kustermann	Senior Intelligence Advisor

TABLE B2: Major DHS Stakeholders Consulted for Pilot Project		
Component	**Name**	**Title**
I&A Leadership	Charlie Allen	Under Secretary For Intelligence
	Jack Tomarchio	Deputy Under Secretary for Operations
	Mary Connell	Deputy Assistant Secretary for Intelligence
	Chet Lunner	Deputy Assistant Under Secretary for External Communications
I&A SLPO	Rob Riegle	Director
	Patti Litman	Consultant
	John Johnson	Consultant
I&A Representatives to Pilot Sites/Areas	Stevie Davis	I&A representative to STIC
	Mark Glass	I&A representative to FFC
	Kerri Morgan	I&A representative to NYSIC
	Lisa Palmieri	I&A representative to CFC
	Matt Skonovd	I&A representative to Sacramento RTTAC
	John Beal	Northeast Region Coordinator
	Eric Kennedy	Southeast Region Coordinator
I&A Borders and CBRNE Threat Analysis (BCTA)	Don Torrence	Former Director
	Maureen McCarthy	Director
I&A Critical Infrastructure Threat Analysis (CITA)	Melissa Smislova	Director
	Steve Maebus	Senior Intelligence Officer
I&A HETA	Tara Hardiman	Director
	Howard Clark	Senior Analyst with STIC focus for pilot period
	Jon Kantor	Senior Analyst with NYSIC and CFC focus for pilot period
	Ann Wessel	Senior Analyst with FFC focus for pilot period
	Trevor Wilson	Senior Analyst with Sacramento RTTAC focus for pilot period
I&A IWW	Kevin Baker	Director
I&A CR	Chris Stevens	Acting Director
	Tammy Barbour	Acting Branch Chief
	Skip Vandover	Chief, Information Services Section
	Clem Avery	RFI Manager
	Tyler Foulkes	OSINT Section Chief
I&A Information Sharing & Knowledge Management (IM)	Carter Morris	Director
	Jeff Sands	Homeland Security State and Local Intelligence Community of Interest Program Manager
I&A PM	Tim Martin	Director
	David Licastro	Deputy Director
Office of Operations Coordination NOC	Wes Moy	Deputy Director
	Laura Manning	Deputy Director for Fusion
	Andrew Brock	NOC Fusion Desk member at the time

TABLE B3: Major Intelligence and Law Enforcement Community Members Consulted for Pilot Project		
Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI)	David Shedd	Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Policy, Plans, and Requirements
	Mary Margaret Graham	DDNI for Collection
	Eliot Jardines	Assistant Deputy Director of National Intelligence (ADDNI) for Open Source
	Sabra Horne	Senior Advisor for Open Source
	Mike Tiffany	ADDNI for Homeland Security and Law Enforcement
Homeland Security Advisory Council (HSAC)	Michael Miron	Director, State and Local Officials Senior Advisory Committee
	Candace Stoltz	Director, Private Sector Senior Advisory Committee
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)	John Pistole	Deputy Director
	Mike Mines	Deputy Assistant Director, Directorate of Intelligence
International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP)	Jim McMahon	Chief of Staff; Former New York State Police Superintendant and Homeland Security Advisor
State of Illinois	Chuck Brueggemann	Colonel, Illinois State Police
	Michael Chamness	Chairman, Illinois Terrorism Task Force
Maryland Coordination and Analysis Center	Charles Rapp	Director
State of Massachusetts	Juliette Kayyem	Massachusetts Homeland Security Advisor
State of New York	David Sheppard	New York Homeland Security Advisor
	Jim Steiner	Advisor to the New York Homeland Security Advisor
	Bart Johnson	Deputy Superintendant, Field Command, New York State Police